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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 This case presents the question whether claimants for 
Social Security disability benefits must exhaust Appointments 
Clause challenges before the very administrative law judges 
(ALJs) whose appointments they are challenging.  Because 
both the characteristics of the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) review process and the rights protected by the 
Appointments Clause favor resolution of such claims on the 
merits, we hold that exhaustion is not required in this context 
and therefore will affirm.  
I. BACKGROUND 
The facts here are simple.  After Appellees’—Andrew 
M. Cirko (on behalf of his late wife Sandra L. Cirko) and John 
Steven Bizarre—disability claims were denied by ALJs 
employed by the Social Security Administration, the Supreme 
Court held in Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), that ALJs 
in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercised 
“significant discretion” in carrying out “important functions” 
and were therefore required under the Appointments Clause, 
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, to be appointed by the President, 
a court of law, or a head of department.  Id. at 2053 (citation 
omitted).  Because the ALJs of the SEC were not so appointed, 
the petitioner there was entitled to a new hearing before a 
different constitutionally appointed ALJ.  See id. at 2055. 
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When Lucia was decided, Appellees here were already 
in the process of challenging the SSA’s denial of their claims 
in the District Court, and although they had not previously 
raised this claim, they immediately demanded new hearings on 
the ground that the ALJs of the SSA were likewise 
unconstitutionally appointed.  In response to Lucia and in light 
of an executive order concluding that “at least some—and 
perhaps all—ALJs are ‘Officers of the United States’ and thus 
subject to the Constitution’s Appointments Clause,” Exec. 
Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13, 2018), the 
Acting Commissioner of Social Security conceded the premise 
and in short order reappointed the agency’s administrative 
judges, including both the ALJs and the Administrative 
Appeals Judges (AAJs) of the SSA’s Appeals Council, under 
her own authority.1  Nonetheless, the Commissioner argued 
that Appellees were not entitled to relief because they had not 
previously presented their Appointments Clause challenges to 
their ALJs or the Appeals Council and thus had not exhausted 
those claims before the agency. 
In a comprehensive and analytically rigorous opinion, 
the District Court declined to require exhaustion, vacated the 
agency’s decisions, and remanded for new hearings before 
different, properly appointed ALJs.  The Commissioner now 
appeals. 
                                              
1 Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill, who took 
these actions, was replaced by Commissioner Andrew Saul on 
June 17, 2019.  See Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin., 
https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2019).  Commissioner Saul represents the agency 




The Commissioner’s appeal requires us to decide 
whether SSA claimants may raise Appointments Clause 
challenges in federal court without having exhausted those 
claims before the agency.  The Commissioner argues, based on 
Supreme Court case law and our precedent, that the general 
rule of exhaustion applies in these circumstances so the District 
Court should have dismissed Appellees’ appeals.3  As 
explained below, we disagree.   
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(g).  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review the District Court’s legal rulings de novo.  
Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 181 F.3d 429, 431 
(3d Cir. 1999).   
3 We use “exhaustion” in this opinion to mean issue 
exhaustion, i.e., a requirement that claimants “raise specific 
issues . . . to reserve them for review in federal court.”  Sims v. 
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 113 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment).  Like the Court in Sims, 
which also addressed issue exhaustion, we rely upon McCarthy 
for guidance, id., even though McCarthy dealt with the issue of 
administrative exhaustion—i.e., the rule warning claimants 
that “completely failing” to seek relief through the agency 
process will “forfeit the right to seek judicial review,” id. 
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b)).  Nothing in this opinion, 
however, should be taken to suggest that SSA claimants are 
relieved entirely from the administrative-exhaustion 
requirement so understood, nor do we opine on any issue-
 6 
 
The Commissioner concedes that there is no statutory 
or regulatory exhaustion requirement that governs SSA 
proceedings.  Thus, whether we should impose an exhaustion 
requirement here “is a matter of sound judicial discretion.”  
Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir. 
1980).  To determine whether to impose an exhaustion 
requirement where we have not done so before, we must assess 
(a) the “nature of the claim presented,” (b) the “characteristics 
of the particular administrative procedure provided,” and 
(c) the proper “balance [between] the interest of the individual 
in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum [and] 
countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.”  
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992).  As 
explained below, each of these three considerations supports 
the conclusion that exhaustion of Appointments Clause claims 
is not required in the SSA context.   
A. The Nature of Appointments Clause Claims Does 
Not Favor Exhaustion 
 
We begin with the “nature of [Appellees’] claim.”  See 
McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146.  As a general matter, exhaustion is 
appropriate for certain claims involving “exercise of the 
agency’s discretionary power or when the agency proceedings 
in question allow the agency to apply its special expertise.”  Id. 
at 145.  But exhaustion is generally inappropriate where a 
claim serves to vindicate structural constitutional claims like 
Appointments Clause challenges, which implicate both 
individual constitutional rights and the structural imperative of 
                                              
exhaustion requirement in this context beyond Appointments 
Clause challenges, as that is the question before us today. 
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separation of powers.  Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 
536–37 (1962).   
The importance of the Appointments Clause has been 
recognized since our nation’s founding.  In the colonial system, 
appointments were distributed in “support of a despicable and 
dangerous system of personal influence,” The Federalist 
No. 77, at 421 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894), 
that enabled officers to “harass our people, and eat out their 
substance,” The Declaration of Independence para. 12 (U.S. 
1776).  Indeed, the “power of appointment to offices” was seen 
in the Founding Era as “the most insidious and powerful 
weapon of eighteenth century despotism.”  Freytag v. Comm’r, 
501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991) (quoting Gordon S. Wood, The 
Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787 79, 143 
(1969)).  By requiring that all “Officers of the United States” 
be appointed by the president, a head of department, or a court 
of law, see U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, our Founders sought 
to replace that “despicable and dangerous system,” The 
Federalist No. 77, supra, at 421, with one that favored political 
accountability and neutrality, and our Supreme Court has 
upheld the protection of the Clause in various cases for the 
express purpose of “protec[ting] individual liberty,” NLRB v. 
Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 571 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted), and upholding the “principle of 
separation of powers,” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 
(1976). 
An individual litigant need not show direct harm or 
prejudice caused by an Appointments Clause violation.  As the 
D.C. Circuit has noted, “it will often be difficult or impossible 
for someone subject to a wrongly designed scheme[, including 
an Appointments Clause violation,] to show that the design—
the structure—played a causal role in his loss.”  Landry v. 
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FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  But this 
difficulty to show direct harm does not diminish the important 
individual liberty safeguarded by the Appointments Clause.  
Such harm is presumed. 
Two cases recognizing these principles, Lucia and 
Freytag, bear heavily on our decision today.  In Lucia, where 
the Court held that the ALJs of the SEC were 
unconstitutionally appointed, it ordered the agency to provide 
the petitioner with a new hearing before a constitutionally 
appointed ALJ different from the original ALJ, explaining that 
the petitioner had made a “timely challenge” by contesting the 
validity of the ALJ’s appointment at the agency appeals level—
though not, apparently, before the ALJ himself.  138 S. Ct. at 
2053–54, 55.  And while the Lucia Court did not expound on 
what made the challenge “timely,” it did cite Freytag, where the 
Court had declined to enforce exhaustion in the Appointments 
Clause context.  See id. at 2053–54 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 
871–82).   
In Freytag, the petitioners not only “fail[ed] to raise a 
timely objection to the assignment of their cases to [the] judge” 
they claimed was unconstitutionally appointed, but they also 
affirmatively “consent[ed] to the assignment.”  501 U.S. at 
878.  “[A]s a general matter,” the Court acknowledged, “a 
litigant must raise all issues and objections at trial.”  Id. at 879.  
Yet, it explained, “the disruption to sound appellate process 
entailed by entertaining objections not raised below does not 
always overcome . . . the strong interest of the federal judiciary 
in maintaining the constitutional plan of separation of powers.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  And given 
the strength of that interest in an Appointments Clause claim, 
the Court excused exhaustion and heard the challenge on the 
merits.  Id. at 880. 
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As the Commissioner here emphasizes, neither Lucia 
nor Freytag map perfectly onto our case:  The former 
addressed a different agency and a claimant who raised the 
Appointments Clause challenge at least on administrative 
appeal, 138 S. Ct. at 2050; and the latter also addressed a 
different agency, and it excused the petitioner’s failure to 
exhaust rather than holding that there was no exhaustion 
requirement in the first instance, 501 U.S. at 878–80.  But these 
cases guide us as we chart our course by instructing that 
Appointments Clause challenges—given their importance to 
separation of powers and, ultimately, individual liberty—are 
claims for which a hearing on the merits is favored.   
B. The Characteristics of SSA Review Counsel Against 
Requiring Exhaustion for This Claim 
 
We turn next to the “characteristics of the particular 
administrative procedure provided here.”  McCarthy, 503 U.S. 
at 146.  We are guided by the teaching of Sims v. Apfel, 530 
U.S. 103 (2000), the Supreme Court’s most recent 
pronouncement on issue exhaustion in SSA proceedings.   
In Sims, the Supreme Court resolved a question closely 
analogous to this one: whether claimants must exhaust issues 
before the SSA’s Appeals Council to obtain judicial review of 
those claims.  See 530 U.S. at 107 (plurality opinion); id. at 113 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  The Court based its holding on two unusual 
features of the SSA review process: first, the Court emphasized 
that because no SSA regulations required exhaustion to the 
Appeals Council, imposing an “additional requirement[]” of 
exhaustion would penalize claimants who did “everything that 
the agency asked,” see id. at 114 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment); second, the Court 
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explained that the inquisitorial nature of Appeals Council 
hearings rendered the case for exhaustion “much weaker” 
because the AAJs did not rely upon the parties “to develop the 
issues in an adversarial administrative proceeding” anyway, 
see id. at 109–10 (plurality opinion).4  For those reasons 
together, the Court declined to require claimants to exhaust 
claims before the Appeals Council.5  See id. at 109–10 
(plurality opinion).  The Court noted, however, that “[w]hether 
a claimant must exhaust issues before [an] ALJ is not before 
us,” leaving that question for a case in which it was squarely 
presented.  Id. at 107 (plurality opinion).   
                                              
4 The Court here consisted of the plurality plus Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence.  See 530 U.S. at 104.  Under the rule 
of Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193–94 (1977) 
(holding that the narrowest opinion of a fragmented Court 
controls), Justice O’Connor’s analysis—which joined the 
portions of the plurality’s opinion cited here—controls.  See 
Sims, 530 U.S. at 113 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (joining Parts I and II-A of 
plurality opinion). 
 
5 As discussed further below, see infra n.11, these 
unique characteristics of the SSA, particularly the lack of any 
statutory or regulatory issue-exhaustion requirements, are what 
separate this case from other post-Lucia decisions holding that 
plaintiffs’ Appointments Clause challenges to ALJs of other 
agencies are forfeited because they failed to raise them before 
the agency.  See, e.g., Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 
738, 746, 749 (6th Cir. 2019) (Department of Labor); Malouf 
v. SEC, 933 F.3d 1248, 1258 (10th Cir. 2019) (SEC). 
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That is the case before us today as concerns 
Appointments Clause challenges.  And while Sims does not 
dictate the answer, its lessons loom large.  Like Appeals 
Council hearings, ALJ hearings have no express exhaustion 
requirement.6  See, e.g., McWilliams v. Berryhill, No. 18-5180, 
2019 WL 2615750, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2019) (“No matter 
how tortured the reading, the SSA regulations fail to squarely 
address [exhaustion].”).  And like Appeals Council hearings, 
ALJ hearings are inquisitorial and driven by the agency rather 
than the claimant:  Whereas ALJs must “look[] fully into the 
issues,” “[a]ccept[] as evidence any documents that are 
material to the issues,” and “decide when the evidence will be 
presented and when the issues will be discussed,” 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.944, claimants need not even state their case or present 
written arguments, see id. § 404.949.  The two rationales 
driving Sims thus generally apply to ALJs no less than AAJs, 
so the “characteristics of the particular administrative 
procedure provided here,” McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146, likewise 
cut against an exhaustion requirement for Appointments 
Clause challenges. 
C. A Balancing of the Individual and Governmental 
Interests Weighs Against Exhaustion 
 
With these points in mind, we turn to our ultimate task 
of “balanc[ing] the interest of the individual in retaining 
prompt access to a federal judicial forum against 
countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.”  
McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146.  This consideration too counsels 
against an exhaustion requirement.   
                                              
6 The Commissioner concedes this point. 
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1. The Individual Interest Is High 
We begin with the individual interest.  As we have 
explained, the Appointments Clause is aimed at more than an 
abstract division of labor between the branches of government:  
“The structural principles secured by the separation of powers 
protect the individual as well,” Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 
211, 222 (2011), so a citizen’s ability to enforce it through a 
merits hearing is critical to “protec[ting] individual liberty,” 
Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 571 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Yet 
that ability would be severely compromised in two respects 
were exhaustion required here.   
First, an exhaustion requirement for Appointments 
Clause claims would impose an unprecedented burden on SSA 
claimants who are subject, not to an adversarial process, but to 
an inquisitorial review process.  While exhaustion may be 
broadly required in an agency where “it is usually ‘appropriate 
under [the agency’s] practice’ for ‘contestants in an adversary 
proceeding’ before it to develop fully all issues there,” Sims, 
530 U.S. at 109 (alteration in original) (quoting United States 
v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 36–37 (1952)), 
the SSA’s inquisitorial system does not fit that description.  In 
the SSA, “[t]he [agency], not the claimant, has primary 
responsibility for identifying and developing the issues,” Sims, 
530 U.S. at 112, such that the ALJ takes “an active 
investigatory role” and “shoulders a statutory obligation to 
obtain evidence,” “to order medical testing,” and “to request 
witnesses,” Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The 
Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to 
Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 
1289, 1303 (1997).  And while the ALJ plays a starring role—
authorized even to subpoena witnesses of their own accord, 
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20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)—the claimant may choose to play a bit 
part and still have his claim determined.  After all, claimants 
are not required to develop facts, let alone make legal 
arguments.  See Dubin, supra, at 1302–04.  Requiring 
exhaustion in this case would upend this arrangement by 
forcing claimants—despite the informal, non-adversarial 
nature of the review process—to root out a constitutional claim 
even beyond the power of the agency to remedy, or 
alternatively risk forfeiture.   
Second, an exhaustion requirement would prejudice 
those claimants who go unrepresented at their ALJ hearings 
and then, perhaps with the benefit of counsel, seek to raise such 
a claim in federal court.7  These pro se claimants already face 
“a disadvantage in the unfamiliar world of law because they 
lack the specialized training of attorneys” and struggle to 
recognize technical legal claims like the Appointments Clause 
claims here.8  Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 418 (6th Cir. 
1996).  Requiring exhaustion would make the consequences of 
                                              
7 Notably, a large percentage—roughly thirty percent—
of claimants go unrepresented at their ALJ hearings.  See Social 
Security Administration (SSA) Annual Data for Representation 
at Social Security Hearings, Soc. Sec. Admin. (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.ssa.gov/open/data/representation-at-ssa-
hearings.html.   
 
8 See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 
(1975) (noting “the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation”); Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 340 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (“Pro se pleadings are often submitted by 




that disadvantage irreparable by precluding these claimants 
from vindicating their rights under the Appointments Clause in 
federal court proceedings.  And we have little reason to think 
those rights will elsewhere be vindicated:  While ALJs must 
probe for meritorious arguments more carefully where 
claimants are unrepresented, Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 
380 (3d Cir. 2003), even the most diligent ALJ is unlikely to 
raise a sua sponte objection to his own appointment.   
The need to protect those individual rights is especially 
acute, however, where, as here, claimants’ “physical condition 
and dependency on the disability benefits” are at 
issue.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976). 
Disability benefits are usually claimants’ primary source of 
income9—highlighting the need for both the appearance and 
reality of fair adjudicators appointed impartially under the 
Appointments Clause and making the “nature of [a disability] 
claim” an “important factor[]” in determining whether to take 
federal jurisdiction over a procedurally flawed administrative 
appeal, id. at 331 n.11.  Indeed, we have said that in such cases 
“the claimant’s interest in having the constitutional issue 
resolved promptly is so great that further deference to agency 
procedures is inappropriate.”  Mattern v. Mathews, 582 F.2d 
248, 253 (3d Cir. 1978).   
In short, the individual interest in Appellees’ 
Appointments Clause challenge being heard on the merits is 
high, and an exhaustion requirement would seriously erode it. 
                                              
9 See Michelle Stegman Bailey & Jeffrey Hemmeter, 
Characteristics of Noninstitutionalized DI and SSI Program 
Participants, 2010 Update, tbl. 4 (2014). 
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2. The Governmental Interest Is Low 
The Government’s interest in requiring exhaustion here, 
on the other hand, is negligible at best.  Traditionally, two 
governmental interests favor exhaustion: deference to agency 
expertise and opportunity for agency error correction.  Neither 
is implicated here.   
The first, deference to agency expertise, is rendered 
irrelevant here by the well-worn maxim that constitutional 
questions, including Appointments Clause challenges, are 
“outside the [agency’s] competence and expertise.”10 Free 
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 491 (2010).  “[C]ourts are at no disadvantage in 
answering” Appointments Clause claims, id., and the 
                                              
10 The Commissioner cites Elgin v. Department of 
Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012), for the proposition that claimants 
must exhaust constitutional challenges even if the agency lacks 
authority to decide them.  But that argument relies upon a 
patent misreading of Elgin, which neither dealt with exhaustion 
nor remarked upon the agency’s competence to hear 
constitutional claims.  See id. at 16–17.  The Commissioner 
also contends that the Appointments Clause challenge here is 
not materially different than a claim for an ALJ’s recusal, 
which we held in Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146 (3d 
Cir. 1971), was waived when it had not been raised before the 
agency.  Id. at 1152.  But in Ginsburg the claimant failed to 
follow the “proper procedure” provided by agency regulations 
for seeking recusal, and that relief, had she followed the 
procedure, was one the ALJ was capable of providing.  Id. at 
1152, 1152 n.4.  That is not the case here, so Ginsburg does 
not control.  
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Commissioner therefore has no legitimate basis to argue that 
agency expertise requires that those claims be exhausted before 
the agency. 
The second traditional rationale for exhaustion is no 
more applicable.  We need not give an agency the opportunity 
for error correction that it is incapable of providing—i.e., 
where it is not “empowered to grant effective relief.”  See 
McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147.  This case falls squarely in that 
category:  At neither the trial nor the appellate levels could the 
SSA’s administrative judges cure the constitutionality of their 
own appointments, whether by reappointing themselves, see 
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051 (explaining that “the President, a 
court of law, or a head of department” must appoint ALJs), or 
by transferring the case to a constitutionally appointed ALJ, 
see Appellant’s Br. 6 (conceding that all SSA ALJs were 
unconstitutionally appointed prior to Lucia).   
The Commissioner urges an error-correction theory 
whereby ALJs presented with an Appointments Clause 
challenge might “note[] their concerns regarding the 
constitutionality of their appointments” to the Commissioner, 
eventually “enabling the Commissioner to take corrective 
action.”  Appellant’s Br. 21 (citing L.A. Tucker, 344 U.S. at 
36–37).  But the Supreme Court rejected this exact argument 
in Mathews v. Eldridge, where it observed that “[i]t is 
unrealistic to expect that the Secretary would consider 
substantial changes in the current administrative review system 
at the behest of a single aid recipient raising a constitutional 
challenge in an adjudicatory context,” particularly as “[t]he 
Secretary would not be required even to consider such a 
challenge.” 424 U.S. at 330; see also McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 
373 U.S. 668, 675–76 (1963) (refusing to require state-court 
exhaustion where theory of relief there was “tenuous”).  So too 
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here, where the Commissioner himself concedes that claimants 
have “no access . . . to the [C]ommissioner directly.”11  Tr. 7:4–
6.  Thus, the only avenues then available to claimants to seek a 
remedy—hearings before ALJs or AAJs—were incapable of 
providing it, and we decline to adopt the Commissioner’s 
attenuated and speculative theory of relief.12    
                                              
11 That alone distinguishes this case from the out-of-
Circuit authority on which the Commissioner relies where the 
challengers, in fact, could have obtained relief from the 
agency.  That is true of both the SSA cases he cites outside the 
Appointments Clause context, see Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 
1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2017) (challenge to vocational expert’s 
methods); Anderson v. Barnhart, 344 F.3d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 
2003) (challenge to evidentiary ruling); Mills v. Apfel, 244 F.3d 
1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001) (same), and the Appointments Clause cases 
he cites outside the SSA context, see Energy W. Mining Co. v. 
Lyle, 929 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2019); Jones Bros., Inc. 
v. Sec’y of Labor, 898 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2018); In re 
DBC, 545 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed Cir. 2008).  But it is not true 
here, at the intersection of those two spheres, where the only 
agency actors to whom the challengers had access—the 
administrative judges themselves—lacked authority to provide 
a remedy.   
 
12 We note the likely futility of claimants raising such 
concerns in those venues because the SSA was aware that the 
ALJ appointments might be rendered unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court yet declined to take corrective action until well 
after Lucia was decided.  See Soc. Sec. Admin., EM-18003: 
Important Information Regarding Possible Challenges to the 
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Unable to invoke either of the two traditional 
exhaustion rationales, the Commissioner asserts a third: that an 
adverse ruling would open the floodgates to the “many 
hundreds of cases in federal district courts in which 
disappointed claimants have sought to raise unpreserved 
Appointments Clause challenges for the first time.”  
Appellant’s Br. 27.  And those cases, we are told, are “just the 
tip of the iceberg” because ALJs issued 493,000 appealable 
dispositions in fiscal year 2018 and, without an exhaustion 
requirement, “every disappointed claimant could obtain a do-
over before a new ALJ simply by raising a Lucia claim in 
district court.”  Appellant’s Br. 28.   
But we deal in facts, not hyperbole, and, on inspection, 
the purported flood is actually a trickle.  Under the applicable 
procedural rules, claimants must appeal the Appeals Council’s 
decision to the District Court within sixty days, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(g), and Lucia was decided more than a year ago, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2044.  That means every claimant whose benefits were 
denied prior to Lucia has long since either filed an appeal in 
district court or become time-barred from doing so.  Those 
whose claims were still at the initial stage will have their claims 
adjudicated by a constitutionally appointed ALJ.  And the SSA, 
in the meantime, has promulgated administrative guidance 
instructing that claimants with cases then pending on 
administrative appeal would have their claims reviewed de 
novo before the now-duly-appointed Appeals Council.13  The 
                                              
Appointment of Administrative Law Judges in SSA’s 
Administrative Process 1–2 (effective Jan. 30, 2018). 
 
13 See SSR 19-1p; Titles II & XVI: Effect of the 
Decision in Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission 
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effect of our decision today, then, is limited to the hundreds 
(not hundreds of thousands) of claimants whose cases are 
already pending in the district courts, a drop in the bucket 
relative to the thousands of claims that the SSA has voluntarily 
ordered (and thus apparently has the resources enabling) the 
Appeals Council to review.   
In sum, there is little legitimate governmental interest in 
requiring exhaustion here.  And, as we have explained, the 
individual interests on the other side of the ledger are 
substantial.  For those reasons, and considering the special 
character of both the agency and the constitutional claim at 
issue, we decline to require exhaustion. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court and remand these consolidated cases to 
the Social Security Administration for new hearings before 
constitutionally appointed ALJs other than those who presided 
over Appellees’ first hearings.   
                                              
(SEC) On Cases Pending at the Appeals Council, 84 Fed. Reg. 
9582–9583 (Mar. 15, 2019).   
